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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists1 attacked the United States,
killing 2,973 innocent civilians. This was the largest loss of life on
U.S. soil due to a hostile act in the nation's history.2 Al Qaeda, an
international terrorist organization, claimed responsibility for the act.3
Al Qaeda had been systematically targeting U.S. civilians and service
members for at least the previous nine years. 4 In response to the
attacks, the United States conducted a series of military and legal
actions that were highly controversial and unprecedented. As part of
these actions, the executive branch claimed the authority to detain
indefinitely individuals it labeled as "enemy combatants." 5
This Note examines the procedures currently used by the
United States to determine whether an individual qualifies as an
enemy combatant. It then assesses the legitimacy of this process in
light of the law of armed conflict, the history of military tribunals, the
special characteristics of the war on terror, and practical necessity.
This Note concludes that the current procedures, although technically
1. "[T]errorism is a concept 'easier to condemn than to define.., or a box with a false
bottom.'... Generally, the term includes the indiscriminate use of violence-particularly against
civilians-to further a political aim." Harvey Rishikof, Is it Time for a Federal Terrorist Court?
Terrorists and Prosecutions: Problems, Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 1, 6 (2003) (quoting Adam Roberts, Can We Define Terrorism, OXFORD TODAY FEATURES,
available at http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/archive/0102/14-2/04.html. Various definitions of
"terrorism" can be found in both federal and international law. One such example is as follows:
[T]he term "terrorism" means activity, directed against United States persons,
which-
(A) is committed by an individual who is not a national or permanent resident
alien of the United States;
(B) involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life which would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States; and
(C) is intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. § 921(22) (2005).
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 311 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
3. See id. at 59-61 (stating that al Qaeda unsuccessfully attacked U.S. forces in Somalia in
1992, trained the insurgents who shot down the Black Hawk helicopters in Somalia in 1993,
attacked a joint Saudi Arabian-U.S. facility in November 1995, detonated a truck bomb at the
Khobar Towers residential complex for U.S. Air Force personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in
June 1996, and may have been involved in both the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and
the 1995 Manila air plot to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific).
4. Id.
5. This Note will only examine non-citizen combatants, as defined by Military Order,
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order], discussed infra.
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legal, must be refined by Congress in order to address the many
shortcomings therein.
II. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The law of armed conflict is designed to "offer a proven, durable
mode of imposing principled constraints on organized violence." 6 The
law of war today can be generally described as falling into two
categories: 7 Hague Law,8 which addresses the methods of conducting
warfare, and Geneva Law, 9 which deals with the protection of the
victims of war. The recent international debate concerning U.S.
6. Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2003)
[hereinafter Jinks, Laws of War].
7. William K. Lietzau, Old Laws, New Wars: A Strategy for Developing International Law
During the Global War on Terrorism 91 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). LtCol.
Lietzau is a United States Marine Corps Judge Advocate General Officer who has served as
Special Advisor to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense ("DoD"), as the Office of
Military Commissions first Acting Chief Prosecutor until May 2003, as head of the Law of Armed
Conflict Branch in the International and Operational Law Division for the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy, and as Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
handling, among other things, arms control and law of war issues. LtCol. Lietzau's biography is
available at www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/d200305221iet.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
His input on this Note is extremely appreciated. Certain portions of LtCol. Lietzau's manuscript
have been published. The intro largely exists in: Combating Terrorism: The Consequences of
Moving from Law Enforcement to War, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN
21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 31 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista, eds., forthcoming) and
in Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 75 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2005). The jus ad
bellum section is largely published in: Old Laws, New Wars: Jus ad Bellum in an Age of
Terrorism, in 2004 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK U.N. L. (MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE
PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW) 383 and in The Role of Military Force in Foreign
Relations, Humanitarian Intervention and the Security Council, 64/2 ZEITSHRIFT FUR
AUFLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT (HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L.) 281 (2004).
8. Hague law is set forth in major part in the Hague Regulations annexed to the Hague
Conventions of 1907. See Lietzau, supra note 7, at 91; S. EXEC. DOC. No. 357, at 2269 (1907);
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. No. 539.
9. Geneva law is set forth in major part in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
two Additional Protocols of 1977. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S. 303;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug.12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC
III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II];
see also U.N. CHARTER.
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enemy combatant detainees has almost exclusively focused on Geneva
Law.10 The starting point, however, for any legal discussion of the
rights of an enemy in the field is the well-established rule that
combatants are legally entitled to kill adversary combatants." This
default rule forms the baseline from which we can measure the due
process rights of captured adversaries. 12 Likewise, the law of armed
conflict gives opposing parties the authority to detain adversaries. 3
A. Is the War on Terror an 'Armed Conflict?"
There has been extensive debate as to whether any of the laws
of war under the Geneva Conventions apply to the "war on terror" led
by the United States. Specifically, does the current conflict rise to the
level of armed conflict described in the Conventions? Although
originally designed for de jure declared wars between nations, the
laws of war also cover de facto armed conflicts. 14 Pursuant to the
Geneva and Hague Conventions, the September 11 attacks did not
initiate an "international armed conflict" because al Qaeda did not act
on behalf of a foreign state.' 5 Common Article III of all Geneva
Conventions, however, also "explicitly regulate[s] internal armed
conflicts-that is, conflicts between states and non-state armed
groups."' 6 The difficult question, therefore, is determining the point at
which an internal disturbance crosses the threshold and becomes an
"armed conflict" under international law. 17
10. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
367, 371-72 (2004) [hereinafter Jinks, Declining Significance] (discussing the applicability of
Geneva POW protection to Guantanamo detainees).
11. See Lietzau, supra note 7, at 119 n.277 (listing authority for combat immunity);
MICHAEL BOTHE ET. AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE
TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 243 (1982)
("[Combatant immunity] provides immunity from the application of municipal law prohibitions
against homicides, wounding and maiming, or capturing persons and destruction of property, so
long as these acts are done as acts of war and do not transgress the restraints of the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict.").
12. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508 n.2 (2004) (holding Mr. Hamdi, as a U.S. citizen,
is entitled to due process under the Constitution, but purposefully not addressing whether any
treaty guarantees access).
13. GC III, supra note 9, art. 21, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-35, 75 U.N.T.S. at 153-54; Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 2640 ("The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and
trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incidents of
war."') (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
14. Jinks, Laws of War, supra note 6, at 10. A de jure war is a traditional declared war,
such as World War II, while de facto armed conflict is open conflict undeclared, and thus,
untraditional in the legal sense. See id.
15. Id. at 12.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id.
1632 [Vol. 58:5:1629
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The drafters of the Geneva Conventions sought to define
internal armed conflicts broadly by applying a limited set of
substantive principles.18 Common Article III provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply,
as a minimum, the following provisions:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or
any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
19
The first clause of this provision imposes the above regulation, by its
express terms, on all parties to a conflict, even non-signatories. 20
The difficulty defining the term "armed conflict" stems from the
vagueness of the actual phrase: "No one can say with assurance
precisely what meaning [the words 'armed conflict not of an
international character'] were intended to convey. ' 21 Despite the
broad definition of the term "armed conflict" under the Conventions,
the war on terror does not appear to be a classic internal armed
conflict (like a civil uprising) because "al Qaeda neither controls, nor
seeks to control territory in the United States. '22 Furthermore, al
Qaeda is neither challenging the legal authority of the United States
within its territory, nor is it suggesting that the United States
exercises illegal dominion over some other territory. Therefore the
conflict is not a "war of national liberation. '23
18. Id. at 16-17.
19. GC I, supra note 9, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38.
20. Jinks, Laws of War, supra note 6, at 18.
21. Id. at 23 (quoting Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward a
Definition of "International Armed Conflict", 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 43 (1971)).
22. Id. at 20.
23. Id.
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Other sources-including the International Committee on the
Red Cross Commentaries, Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, the
judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadic,24 and the statute establishing the
International Criminal Court-all attempt to further refine the
definition of "internal armed conflict. 25  Unfortunately, these
attempts provide little clarity.
Because there is a lack of clarity, we must turn to other
considerations to determine what qualifies as an "armed conflict." To
this end, "two important sets of considerations pertain[:] ... (1) the
intensity of the violence; and (2) the capacity and willingness of the
parties to carry out sustained, coordinated hostilities."26 Additionally,
if the state party to the hostilities interprets the situation as an
"armed conflict," it will be understood as such, regardless of the
criteria. 27 As discussed below, 28 the United States characterizes the
war on terror as a war and is carrying out a comprehensive
international military effort in response. The war on terror, therefore,
should be considered an armed conflict and the protections of Common
Article III should apply.
B. Article V Determination of POW Status
A common criticism of the way the Bush Administration has
handled enemy combatants is that he has failed to provide an Article
V determination as to whether the detainees should be classified as
prisoners of war ("POWs") under the Geneva Conventions. 29 The 1949
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GC III) defines prisoners of war as:
[P]ersons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of
the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
24. 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
25. Jinks, Laws of War, supra note 6, at 25-32.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id, at 32.
28. See infra Part III.
29. Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004) ("RU]ntil a competent
tribunal determines that Hamdan is not entitled to POW status, he [must be treated as a
POW]."), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
1634 [Vol. 58:5:1629
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or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war
30
This Convention speaks of the applicability of POW protection
to certain groups found on the battlefield; however, it was designed to
apply only to the states that signed it: the "High Contracting Parties."
Its terms "shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties. ' 31 The Convention binds the parties to the terms of the treaty
in any conflict with a "Power," even a non-signatory one, if that
"Power" accepts the Convention and applies its provisions. 32 The
drafters of the Geneva Conventions intended the word "Power" to
mean a state. 33 As the Rapporteur of the Special Committee noted,
"the obligation to recognize that the Convention be applied to the non-
contracting adverse State .... ,,34
The Fourth Geneva Convention affords protections to civilians
similar to the protection extended to POWs under GC III. 35 The term
"civilians" under this Convention is defined very broadly.36 Civilian
30. GC III, supra note 9, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40.
31. Id. art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136. High Contracting parties are
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, the Principality of Monaco, Liechtenstein, Chile, India, Czechoslovakia,
the Holy See, Lebanon, Pakistan, Denmark, France, Israel, Norway, Italy, Guatemala, Spain,
Belgium, the Republic of the Philippines, Mexico, Egypt, El Salvador, Luxembourg, Austria,
Syria, Nicaragua, Sweden, Turkey, Cuba, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Rumania,
Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ecuador, Poland, Finland, the United States of America, the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Union of South Africa, Japan, San Marino, Vietnam, Liberia,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Thailand. Id.
32. Id. ("Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.").
33. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 136 n.326.
34. JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS OF WAR 22 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (emphasis added) (quoting 2-B FINAL RECORD
OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 108).
35. See GC IV, supra note 9, (establishing the protection of civilians during times of war in
the hands of enemies and under any occupation by a foreign power).
36. GC IV, supra note 9, art 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290 ("Persons protected by
the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
1636 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1629
protections include "due process rights ...; the right to humane
treatment; freedom from coercive interrogation; freedom from
discrimination; the right to repatriation... ; the right to internal camp
governance; and the prohibition on attacks directed against civilian
objects (including... hospitals and other facilities providing essential
services. . .)."37 Again, this Convention only applies to the parties who
signed it.38
There is significant debate as to whether these civilian
protections apply to every captured person who is not a POW, or only
to those who take no part in the fighting.39 The ICRC and many other
human rights organizations hold the former view.40 First, they argue
that the text appears to support this view, as it defines persons
protected as "those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves ... in the hands of a Party... of which
they are not nationals."41 Furthermore, given the detailed definition
of protected categories found elsewhere in the Conventions, some feel
the broadness of this definition signals that it was meant to serve as a
catch-all provision. 42 The drafting history of the Convention also
provides some support for this view.43
The contrary view, that civilian protections only apply to those
who take no part in the fighting, uses nearly the same evidence to
support its position. This view posits that the articles defining
protected persons are written very finitely and that none contains an
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals.").
37. Jinks, Declining Signficance, supra note 10, at 381.
38. Id. ("Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by
it."). Of course, Common Article 3 does still apply as explained above. See supra Part II.A.
39. Compare id. at 381-86 (arguing that these civilian protections "apply to all enemy
nationals - including unlawful combatants - not protected by other Conventions") with F.
Kalshoven, The Position of Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, 11 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL
MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE (MIL. L. & L. OF WAR REV.) 55, 70-71 (1972) (adopting view
that combatants who do not fall into any GC III, art. 4 category were not taken into account in
drafting GC IV).
40. See International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and
Terrorism: Questions and Answers, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsffhtml/5YNLEV (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005) ("Civilians detained for security reasons must be accorded the protections
provided for in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Combatants who do not fulfil [sic] the requisite
criteria for POW status (who, for example, do not carry arms openly) or civilians who have taken
a direct part in hostilities in an international armed conflict (so-called 'unprivileged' or 'unlawful'
belligerents) are protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention provided they are enemy
nationals.").
41. GC IV, supra note 9, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
42. Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 10, at 383-84.
43. See id. (listing supportive history).
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explicit "all other" clause, so a catch-all cannot be implied. 44
Additionally, the text of Protocol I discusses minimum procedures for
those who neither qualify for POW status, nor are entitled to "more
favourable treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention."45
Drafting history also supports the position that unlawful combatants
are not protected.46
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, even if enemy
combatants are protected as "civilians," they can still be detained
indefinitely for security reasons. 47 This condition appears in the so-
called "derogation provision," which provides:
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual
protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security
of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and
privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such
individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or
saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the
Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so
requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present
Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of
trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the
present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a
protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the
security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.
4 8
The "derogation provision" has several limitations. First, the
text suggests that this article only applies in occupied territory or in
the territory of the detaining state.49 Second, the article only applies
when the detaining state has "good reason to suspect that a particular
individual has engaged in hostile acts. ' 50 Third, the Convention may
only be suspended, and only for such time as necessary, to preserve
44. See Lietzau, supra note 7, at 153 n.372 ("The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
observed the same during their ratification hearings. '[A] new Convention [GC IV] was drawn up
at the Geneva Convention in 1949, which spells out to a degree never before attempted the
obligations of the parties to furnish humanitarian treatment to two broad categories of civilians:
enemy aliens present within the home territory of a belligerent, and civilian persons found in
territory which it occupies in the course of military operations."') (quoting S. EXEC. REP. No. 84-9,
at 2).
45. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 45, para. 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24.
46. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 152; see, e.g., Vol. IIA FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 622 ("although the two conventions might appear to cover all
the categories concerned, irregular belligerents were not actually protected.").
47. GC IV, supra note 9, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92.
48. Id.
49. Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 10, at 388.
50. Id at 389. Presumably, most Guantanamo detainees would satisfy this low threshold.
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security. 51 Finally, the protections provided in the last paragraph,
that the detained shall be treated humanely and provided with the
rights of a fair and regular trial, cannot be suspended, regardless of
any security concerns. 52
The drafters of these Conventions did not anticipate the unique
nature of the war on terror; for that reason, the Conventions do not
apply neatly to this type of conflict. It seems illogical that a group of
organized combatants engaging in sustained or systematic combat
activities should receive nearly the same protection as innocent
civilians detained incident to combat. The Conventions prohibit the
intentional or reckless killing of civilians, 53 and yet, belligerents have
the undisputed authority to kill adversary belligerents.5 4 These
provisions appear to conflict; classifying captured al Qaeda adversary
belligerents as civilians would mean that, prior to capture, U.S. armed
forces were intentionally targeting and killing these civilians. Al
Qaeda members can be considered "unlawful combatants" because
they take up arms against another armed force without lawful
authority to do so under the laws of war. 55 However, "[b]ecause the
law of war encourages distinguishing between combatants and
noncombatants when using force, there is a corollary principle that
protected noncombatants may not take up arms against the armed
force that is presumably respecting their protected status."56  If
combatants were permitted to take advantage of the United States'
51. Id. at 390.
52. Id. at 391.
53. See, e.g., Mark David Maxwell, The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield: Are We
Undermining Civilian Protections?, MILITARY R., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 17-18 ("During the 20th
century, the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols
'explicitly confirm[ed] the customary rule that innocent civilians must be kept outside hostilities
as far as possible and enjoy general protection against danger arising from hostilities."') (citing
COMMENTARY TO THE FIRST PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 615
(Yves Sandoz, et al. eds., 1977).
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
55. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL (United States Army), OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 22 (2003), available at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/
AC/TJAGSAWeb.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset (stating that "persons who commit hostile acts against
U.S. forces or serious criminal acts and are captured do not meet the legal criteria for [prisoner of
war status] under [GC III]. These persons may be termed 'detainees' instead of [prisoners of
war].").
56. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 148-49 & n.355 (citing BOTHE, supra note 11, at 243, and
stating that "[c]ivilians who participate directly in hostilities, as well as spies and members of
the armed forces who forfeit their combatant status, do not enjoy that privilege, and may be
tried, under appropriate safeguards, for direct participation in hostilities as well as for any crime
under municipal law which they might have committed").
1638 [Vol. 58:5:1629
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compliance with the laws of war,57 it would be increasingly difficult to
distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and perhaps
prompt countries to ignore the laws of war.58
The Geneva Conventions provide procedures for determining
whether a particular individual or group belongs to any of the
categories mentioned above. Article V of the Geneva Convention
allows for this determination to be made by a tribunal: "Should any
doubt 'arise as to whether persons.., belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal."59  The mechanism the United
States uses to makes these Article V determinations is the AR 190
tribunal.
C. The AR 190 tribunal
Joint regulation AR 190-8 details the mechanics of the
"competent tribunal" referenced in GC 111.60 The tribunal, commonly
referred to as the AR 190, is composed of three commissioned
officers. 61 The AR 190 regulation gives specific instructions regarding
the following tribunal procedures: the oath,6 2 the record,63 the
openness of the proceedings, 64 the right to an interpreter, 65 the
presence of the detainee, 66 the rules regarding witnesses, 67 the right to
57. For example, in Iraq many insurgent use mosques, hospitals, and other protected
targets as strongholds because they know the rules of war prohibit targeting these structures
outright.
58. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 149.
59. GC III, supra note 9, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42 (emphasis
added).
60. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees,
Army Regulation 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1, available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/arl90-8.pdf (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter AR 190].
61. Id. 1-6c. There is no requirement that any of these officers have legal training,
although "[a]nother non-voting officer, preferably an officer in the Judge Advocate General
Corps, shall serve as the recorder." Id.
62. Id. 1-6e(1) ('Members of the Tribunal and the recorder shall be sworn.").
63. Id. 1-6e(2) ("A written record shall be made of the proceedings.").
64. Id. 1-6e(3) ("Proceedings shall be open except for deliberation and voting . .
65. Id. 1-6e(4) ("Persons whose status is to be determined.., will be provided an
interpreter if necessary.").
66. Id. 1-6e(5) ("Persons whose status is to be determined shall be allowed to
attend ... ").
67. Id. 1-6e(6) ("Persons whose status is to be determined shall be allowed to call
witnesses if reasonably available .... ).
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testify, 68 the prohibition on compulsion to testify, 69 and the burden of a
preponderance of the evidence. 70 The AR 190 tribunal determines
which among the following categories a detainee belongs to:
EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War]
Recommended RP [Retained Personnel], entitled to EPW protections, who should be
considered for certification as a medical, religious, or volunteer aid society RP.
Innocent civilian who should be immediately returned to his home or released.
Civilian Internee who for reasons of operational security, or probable cause incident to
criminal investigation, should be detained.
7 1
The regulation is broad enough to allow a tribunal determination that
a detainee belongs in any of the above categories. Missing from the
list, notably, is the term "unlawful combatant."
III. THE CURRENT PROCEDURES
On November 13, 2002, President Bush issued a military order
establishing that non-citizens 72 captured either domestically or abroad
would be transferred immediately to the control of the Secretary of
Defense to be tried by a military tribunal for violations of the laws of
war and other applicable laws. 73 The order has broad application,
applying to individuals if
there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have
as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described [above] .... 7 4
Individuals who meet these criteria are designated "enemy
combatants"7 5 and will be detained "until hostilities cease. '7 6  An
68. Id. 1-6e(7) ("Persons whose status is to be determined have a right to testify .... ").
69. Id. 1-6e(8) ("Persons whose status is to be determined may not be compelled to
testify ... ").
70. Id. 1-6e(9) ("Preponderance of the evidence shall be the standard . .
71. Id. 1-6e(10).
72. Although much of the current debate and casework has focused on detained citizens, the
order expressly reads that "[tlhe term 'individual subject to this order' shall mean any individual
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additional, and very important, criterion for finding that a detainee is
an "enemy combatant" is his intelligence value. 77 A given detainee
must either pose a severe threat to security, await trial for violations
of the laws of war, or possess some informational value to the United
States that justifies moving him from a prison in the country of
capture 78 to Camp X-Ray in Cuba.
The intersection of law of war and traditional criminal law
informs the debate over the appropriateness of moving detainees. The
law of armed conflict suggests that the United States should detain
combatants until the end of active hostilities regardless of any trial or
charges, 79 yet U.S. criminal law norms suggest that combatants be
granted the usual protections provided to criminal defendants by the
U.S. Constitution.80 As discussed below, the Bush Administration
decided not to apply traditional Geneva Convention norms and created
two unique procedures: the Combat Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT"')
and the Administrative Review Board ("ARB").
A. The Bush Administration's Decision
In regards to the war in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration
initially decided that no one on the battlefield complied with the
requirements of Article IV; thus it eliminated any doubt as to possible
75. Originally, the Administration planned on using the Quirin "unlawful belligerent"
rhetoric, but "[d]ue to the public confusion generated by the use of the 'unlawful combatant'
moniker at several Department of Defense press conferences the modifier 'unlawful' was
subsequently replaced with the word 'enemy.' This substitution clarified that the legal authority
to detain had nothing to do with presumed culpability (i.e., authority to detain was a function of
status as an 'enemy,' not a per se claim that the enemy had acted unlawfully)." Lietzau, supra
note 7, at 147-48.
76. GC III, supra note 9, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224 ("Prisoners of war
shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
77. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Transfer of Detainees Completed (Sept. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.dod.mil/releases/2004/nr20040922-1310.html ("The decision to transfer a
detainee to Guantanamo is based on their further intelligence value to the United States and
whether they continue to pose a threat to the United States.").
78. Prisons still exist and are used to detain enemy combatants in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. See, e.g., U.S. Frees 80 Prisoners in Afghanistan, BIRMINGHAM POST, Jan. 17, 2005,
at 9, available at 2005 WL 56477089 ("The US military was still holding 300 prisoners in
Afghanistan late last year ... ").
79. See GC III, supra note 9, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224 ("Prisoners of
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
80. See, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The length
of time the defendant will be incarcerated before trial is not a factor listed in the statute. It
cannot, however, be ignored without running afoul of constitutional due process and bail
provisions."), rev'd by 777 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1985).
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application of the protections of the Conventions.81  The
Administration then justified the denial of POW status to al Qaeda
members because, it argued, the Geneva Convention did not apply in
its entirety as al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party.8 2
1. Criticism of the Administration's Position
Some critics argue that the denial of POW status (or, at the
very least, an Article V determination), violates established military
procedures.8 3  This argument, however, is only partially correct.
Although the default military policy is to treat all captives as POWs,
the AR 190 regulation provides for POW status treatment only "until
some other legal status is determined by competent authority."8 4 The
term "competent authority" does not appear to be a term of art. The
Commander-in-Chief is a "competent authority" who can make such
decisions about the groups on the ground ex ante.8 5 Therefore, even
though the "doubt" referred to in GC III is arguably an objective one,
the final decision must rest with the executive.8 6 Everyone captured
on the battlefield will be treated humanely in accordance with
Common Article III, but not everyone will receive the increased
protections of POW status.87
81. See Ari Fleischer, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention (May 7,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O5/20030507-18.html ("Under
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention... Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW status.").
82. See id. ("Al Qaeda is an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a state
party to the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva
Convention, and are not entitled to POW status under the treaty.").
83. See, e.g., Evan J. Wallach, Afghanistan, [Quirin], and [Uchiyama]: Does the Sauce Suit
the Gander? ARMY LAWYER, Nov. 2003, at 18 ("This policy is grounded in long standing ideals.
For over 220 years, our nation's founding principles have extolled the values of human life, and
they form the basis for humane treatment of enemy prisoners of war. National ideals demand it,
international law requires it .... [T[he U.S. Army's honor and reputation depend on firm but
humane POW treatment...." (quoting Walter R. Schumer et al., Treat Prisoners Humanely,
MIS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 83)).
84. See AR 190, supra note 60, 1-5a(2) ("All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will
be provided with the protections of the GPW until some other legal status is determined by
competent authority.").
85. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 100 n.9 (2004) ("In 2002, a top legal advisor in the Justice Department told
the White House that 'the President enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief authority."').
86. Id.
87. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Michael L. Smidt, "To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question"
Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel, ARMY LAWYER, June
1999, at 1 ("As Executive Agent, the Secretary of the Army's policy is that all persons 'captured,
detained, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict
will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they fall into the hands of U.S.
forces until final release or repatriation.' Moreover, all persons taken into custody are to be
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Additional criticism rests on theories that seem plausible at
first glance, yet ultimately have no basis in international law.8 8 For
example, some suggest that al Qaeda members in Afghanistan could
qualify as members of the Taliban armed forces or as members of its
integral militia.8 9 Alternatively, they could be considered members of
a volunteer militia or 9° possibly members of a levee en masse. 91
These arguments, however, fail for two reasons: (1) al Qaeda did not
represent the government of Afghanistan, and (2) the Bush
Administration's decision that Taliban members did not qualify as
POWs.
Al Qaeda was in no way subordinate to the Taliban. 92 Bin
Laden, the leader and founder of al Qaeda, initially moved into a
portion of Afghanistan controlled by rival warlords, and, even after
the Taliban cemented its control, he often had strained relations with
the Taliban.93 The relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda
appears to be limited to shared ideology and financial symbiosis.94 Bin
Laden even considered moving his base to other countries, including
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.95 Furthermore, no evidence exists proving
that al Qaeda members were part of the Taliban National Guard or
subordinate militia. Even if al Qaeda were considered a militia of
some sort, it does not meet the demands of GC III, article 4(2),
especially subparts (b) and (d).96  Hence, "[m]aking no effort to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population or to identify
afforded the protections of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GPW) until their legal status is determined by competent authority.") (emphasis added)
(quoting AR 190, supra note 60, at 1-5 a(1)).
88. See, e.g., Wallach, supra note 83, at 21-27 (arguing that Taliban members could qualify
for Article IV treatment under a number of theories).
89. Id. at 22-26.
90. Id. at 26-27.
91. Id. at 27.
92. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-67.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 66.
96. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
GC III, supra note 9, art. 4(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
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themselves as a military unit, al Qaeda's entire raison de'tre appears
to be killing and terrorizing innocent civilians."97
President Bush's argument against extending POW status to
the Taliban is less tenable than his decision regarding al Qaeda. The
apparent justification for his position is that because Taliban fighters
did not comply with GC III, article 4(2)98 (they did not have distinctive
uniforms, carry arms openly, etc.), they did not qualify for POW
protection.99 This analysis is flawed because under article 4(1),100
Taliban members may qualify as members of the regular Afghanistan
army. The fact that the United States did not recognize the Taliban
as the legitimate government of Afghanistan is irrelevant; article
IV(3) allows for "[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power." The question essentially becomes "whether the
Taliban represent[ed] the armed forces of Afghanistan" even though
they never claimed such status. 101
Unlike in Afghanistan, in Iraq, the Administration decided
captured enemies may qualify for POW status. 0 2  In the
Administration's opinion, groups existed in Iraq that fell under GPW
Article IV protections; therefore U.S. forces did conduct normal EPW
procedures. 10 3 Despite this determination, however, coalition troops
captured unlawful combatants on the battlefield (such as the Saddam
97. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 144.
98. See infra text accompanying note 166.
99. Fleischer, supra note 81 ('Under Article 4... however, Taliban detainees are not
entitled to POW status. To qualify as POWs under Article 4, al Qaeda and Taliban detainees
would have to have satisfied four conditions .... The Taliban have not effectively distinguished
themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."); see also John Yoo, Commentary,
Terrorists have no Geneva Rights, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at A16 (stating that Taliban
fighters lost the protections of POW status "by failing to obey the standards of conduct for legal
combatants"). Professor Yoo wrote the article to defend the advice he gave the President in his
former role as a member of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. Id.
100. 'Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces." GC III, supra note 9, art. 4(1), 6 U.S.T. at
3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
101. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 145. The argument, not resolved here, is whether Article IV(l)
stands alone or is subsumed by the four-part test in Article IV(2). See id. at 145 n.346.
102. See Yoo, supra note 99, at A16 ("It is important to recognize the differences between the
war in Iraq and the war on terrorism. The treatment of those detained at Abu Ghraib is
governed by the Geneva Conventions, which have been signed by both the U.S. and Iraq.
President Bush and his commanders announced early in the conflict that the Conventions
applied.").
103. See News Briefing, Dep't of Defense, ASD PA Clarke and Maj. Gen. McChrystal, Mar
24, 2003, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tO3242003-tO324asd.html
("We are treating all of the POWs in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, with dignity and
respect, and they will soon have access to the Red Cross.").
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Fedayeen, for example), 10 4 and detained them as civilian internees. 10 5
The AR 190 tribunal was presumably available to hear the facts of a
detained individual's case, determine into which of the predetermined
groups this individual fell, and treat him in accordance with the law of
armed conflict as applied to his particular group. The tribunal,
however, would only be conducted if doubt existed as to which group
the detainee belonged. The Administration's decision in Iraq
demonstrates that even in the war on terror, certain instances may
arise that justify the use of traditional law of war norms.
Some criticize 10 6 the Administration's treatment of captured
enemies as it did not provide an Article V "competent tribunal" to
assign an appropriate classification to the detainees.10 7 This criticism,
however, evinces a misreading of the law of war.108 The "competent
tribunal" is only used to determine the facts of the detainee's status
"[s]hould any doubt arise" as to the detainee's status. 09 It follows,
then, that if there is no doubt as to a detainee's status, the Article V
tribunal is unnecessary.110
104. See Q&A: What is the Fedayeen Saddam?, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international
backgroundiraq2032503.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (stating that the Fedayeen fighters are
"[miostly young men aged 16 and up. They are armed with machine guns, rocket-powered
grenade launchers, and truck-mounted artillery. Fedayeen reportedly dress in civilian clothes in
order to confuse coalition forces. Pentagon officials said March 24 that the Fedayeen, who are
considered very loyal to the regime, act as enforcers in regular army units, threatening to kill
soldiers who try to surrender."). By dressing irregularly and killing surrendering soldiers, this
group would probably not qualify for POW status. See GC III, supra note 9, art. 4(2), 6 U.S.T. at
3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
105. See Roberto Iraola, Enemy Combatants, the Courts, and the Constitution, 56 OKLA. L.
REV. 565, 569 n.18 (2003) ("In connection with this war, it appears that Iraqi prisoners will be
treated as prisoners of war unless the U.S. government deems them unlawful combatants, in
which case the government may send them to Guantanamo Bay or other holding facilities.").
106. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 38 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
107. GC III, supra note 9, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.
108. Ruth Wedgwood, Judicial Overreach, WALL ST. J., Nov 16, 2004, at A24, available at
2004 WL-WSJ 98741622 ("In this case, the district judge's ruling is either wordplay, or a
misunderstanding of the role of status review panels under the Third Geneva Convention.").
109. GC III, supra note 9, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.
113. The decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 1 10 which held that the decision to detain based on
a CSRT was unlawful because of a lack of an Article V determination, has been widely criticized:
Adam Roberts, professor of international relations at Oxford, makes a suggestion that a
district judge might note. "In a struggle involving an organisation that plainly does not
meet the criteria" of lawful combatants, he wrote in 2002, "and especially where, as with
Al Qaeda, it is not in any sense a State, it may be reasonable to proclaim that captured
members are presumed not to have PoW status." The judge may equally wish to take
account of the advice of British law-of-war authority Col. GLAD Draper, who wrote in
1970 that "the Detaining Power seems to be the sole arbiter, in good faith, of whether a
doubt occurs as to the status of the individual concerned." Francophone scholar Ameur
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Article V tribunals make factual determinations while the
detaining power, in this case the United States, makes the legal
decisions. The Administration ruled as a matter of law that none of
the groups the United States encountered, outside of Iraq, merit POW
status. Additionally, the relief sought by many detainees bringing
suit-an AR 190 hearing-seems inappropriate. It is unwise to have
numerous panels of three commissioned officers, possibly nonlawyers,
determining that certain groups should be protected under the Geneva
Conventions, when the Administration, with its superior resources
and legal staffing, has already made the determination that the
Conventions do not apply. These three officers should not be given the
unilateral authority to make (potentially inconsistent)11 ' policy
decisions with global ramifications. This is not the purpose for which
the AR 190 was designed; the AR 190 should examine the particular
facts and circumstances of a captured individual and determine to
which group he belongs. This seems to be a disagreement with the
Bush Administration's policy, albeit a very understandable one,
masquerading as a legal argument.
In sum, despite the fact that the disagreements with the
Administration's decision that none of the Taliban qualified for POW
status or an Article V tribunal are thoughtful, well-articulated, and
founded on moral grounds, these disagreements are fundamentally
unsound. Even assuming that the Administration's actions do violate
international law, the proper forum in which to correct these
violations does not seem to be domestic courts. The Geneva
Convention is not a "self-executing" document: 112
"Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the document, as a whole, evidences
an intent to provide a private right of action." Goldstar (Panama) v. United States, 967
F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir.1992). The Geneva Convention evinces no such intent. Certainly
there is no explicit provision for enforcement by any form of private petition. And what
discussion there is of enforcement focuses entirely on the vindication by diplomatic
means of treaty rights inhering in sovereign nations ... We therefore agree with other
Zemmali, now with the Red Cross, takes the same view in his scholarly work.
Wedgewood, supra note 111.
111. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England discussed possible inconsistencies in the
structurally similar CSRTs. See Gordon England, Special Defense Department Briefing on
Statute of Military Tribunals [hereinafter Secretary England Briefing], available at
http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20041220.1841.html ("Now we've set a pretty high
standard, and we have an independent board. So we have a board with-we've given broad
instructions in terms of what to consider. And I will tell you these are judgmental calls. I mean,
a different board could come out with a different answer, just like a jury or a judge can come-
different judges or different juries can come out with different answers.").
112. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S. Ct.
2633 (2004) ("This argument [that Article 5 of the Geneva Convention 'requires an initial formal
determination of his status'] falters also because the Geneva Convention is not self-executing.").
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courts of appeals that the language in the Geneva Convention is not "self-executing" and
does not "create private rights of action in the domestic courts of the signatory
countries."
1 1 3
Therefore, if there has been a violation of international law, the high-
contracting parties must settle the issue by resorting to diplomacy.
Not only is this result proper under the law of war, it is sound for
pragmatic reasons as well. For example, imagine an unwilling guest
of the "Hanoi Hilton" attempting to challenge the treatment he was
then receiving at the hand of his captors while a POW by bringing suit
in a Vietnamese court. 1 4
2. Defenses of Bush's Policy
The fact that some detainees receive only a hearing to ensure
they are not innocent civilians is sufficient. For the most part, either
the theater they were captured in did not rise to the level of armed
conflict described in GC III or the current adversaries did not qualify
for a hearing under Article IV. Even if detainees did receive an AR
190 hearing, and even if the hearing ruled that they were POWs, little
would change in terms of their treatment. Again, the detainees would
still be held until the end of hostilities, tried in front of the established
military commissions, and questioned. Therefore, policy justifies the
Administration's decision as well.
Continued questioning of detainees and POWs is permissible
as long as Common Article III is not violated. Article III requires that
questioning cannot rise to the level of "violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture," nor can it encompass "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."'" 5 The Abu Ghraib
prison abuses violated this standard. Abu Ghraib, hopefully, was an
113. Id. at 468-69.
114. The "Hanoi Hilton" was an infamous POW facility located in North Vietnam, noted for
its mistreatment of American servicemen. For example, Senator John McCain spent over five
years as a POW in North Vietnam after the A-4 Skyhawk he flew was shot down by a surface-to-
air missile. He, like other American POWs in the "Hanoi Hilton," was tortured nearly every day.
See John McCain, How the POW's Fought Back, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 14, 1973,
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1084711/posts ("They bounced me from
pillar to post, kicking and laughing and scratching. After a few hours of that, ropes were put on
me and I sat that night bound with ropes. Then I was taken to a small room. For punishment
they would almost always take you to another room where you didn't have a mosquito net or a
bed or any clothes. For the next four days, I was beaten every two to three hours by different
guards. My left arm was broken again and my ribs were cracked.").
115. GC III, supra note 9, art. 3(l)(a), (c), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
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aberration caused more by a breakdown in military leadership and a
chaotic environment than any policy of torture. 116
As far as trial by military commission is concerned, although
many argue that anything other than a court martial would violate
the Geneva Conventions, "[t]he important point is that the procedures
utilized in criminal proceedings must comport with the increasingly
robust, increasingly precise body of international standards-
irrespective of whether the tribunal is a 'military court martial,'
'military commission,' 'national security court,' or 'federal district
court."' 117 The procedures established by the military commissions" 8
almost certainly meet the requirements enumerated in common
Article III, which requires "a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples." 119  As Professor Derek Jinks explains, "[t]he
conferral of POW status [to Guantanamo detainees] would not alter
significantly the international legal duties owed the war detainees...
[and] no pressing policy matters turn on the choice between the
potentially applicable protective schemes."'120
The only advantage of POW status is that it would grant the
detainees combat immunity. This would be of little help, however,
because combat immunity does not protect terrorist acts, and,
furthermore, it does not appear that any of the detainees will be tried
for actions they took in regular combat. 121 It is extremely unlikely
that combatants taken on the battlefield will be denied combat
immunity (for example, a Taliban soldier would not be tried as a
murderer for shooting an adversarial U.S. soldier on the battlefield),
because "sound policy rationales [exist] for prosecuting only those
captured combatants who have committed acts that violate the laws of
war."'122 Again, killing the enemy is not an automatic violation of the
law of war. Denying unlawful combatants combat immunity for true
combat actions would weaken Bush's position. Regardless, only a very
small percentage of detainees will ever see a trial. Whether they are
116. See Heather MacDonald, How to Interrogate Terrorists, CITY JOURNAL, Winter 2005, at
24, available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/15_1_terrorists.html (describing the techniques
used in investigating Afghani detainees and asserting that the abuses at Abu Ghraib had
nothing to do with interrogation techniques at Guantanamo).
117. Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 10, at 435 (emphasis added).
118. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1: Procedures for Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
[hereinafter "MCO 1"], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol.pdf.
119. GC III, supra note 9, art. 3(1)(d), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
120. Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 10, at 439.
121. See id. at 440.
122. Id.
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POWs, enemy combatants, or civilians, the detainees are being held
because, in the view of the executive, they are a threat to national
security.
3. Aftermath of the Bush Decision
Following the Bush Administration's policy decisions not to
apply traditional law of war norms, the Department of Defense
quickly established military commissions at Camp X-ray, located
within Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Individuals subject to
military tribunals were transferred to Camp X-ray, both from the
battlefield and from within the United States. 123 Initially, the orders
establishing the tribunals dealt primarily with the mechanics of trying
enemy combatants for crimes. 124 The orders were notably silent on
how to decide whether, in fact, the detainee was subject to the
tribunal at all.125 The Supreme Court decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
changed that, however, forcing the government to conduct fact-
intensive inquiries to determine if a citizen-detainee was justly
held. 126
The current procedures establish three separate tribunals: (1)
the CSRT127; (2) ARB 28; and (3) the Military Commissions. 29 The
CSRTs employ the most debated procedures. As discussed above, the
law of armed conflict arguably allows indefinite detention to protect
U.S. forces by preventing enemies from returning to the fight °30 before
123. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715-16 (2004) (detainee suspected of
terrorism seized when he disembarked plane in Chicago and was transferred from federal to
military custody); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635-36 (2004) (detaining citizen
allegedly found engaged in active combat against U.S. forces).
124. See, e.g., MCO 1, supra note 118.
125. See Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111 ("As you will recall, CSRTs were largely
put together in direct response to the Supreme Court ruling . .
126. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-52.
127. See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunals [hereinafter "CSRT Orde&'], available at http://www.dod.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707
review.pdf (establishing tribunals and applicable procedures).
128. See Dep't of Defense Memorandum, Implementation of Administrative Review
Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay [hereinafter
ARB Implementation Memo], available at http://www.dod.gov/news/Sep20O4/d2OO40914admin
review.pdf (establishing an annual review of detainees designated enemy combatants to
determine whether detention is still authorized).
129. See MCO 1, supra note 118, at 2 (establishing commissions that "shall have jurisdiction
over violations of the laws of war and all other offenses triable by military commission").
130. Dep't of Defense, Guantanamo Detainees, http://www.dod.gov/news/Apr2004/
d20040406gua.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter, Guantanamo Detainees] ("Detention
of enemy combatants in wartime is not an act of punishment. It is a matter of security and
military necessity. It prevents enemy combatants from continuing to fight against the U.S. and
its partners in the war on terror. Releasing enemy combatants before the end of the hostilities
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the cessation of hostilities,, or, alternatively, by detaining civilians if
releasing them would "be prejudicial to the security of such State."'131
The ARB serves to mitigate the severity of this process by annually
determining whether detention is still justified, even if hostilities have
not ceased. 132
Although much discussion has focused on the legality of trying
detainees by the Military Commissions instead of granting them a
normal criminal trial,133 the reality is that many of the detainees
deemed to be enemy combatants will never see trial. 134 They are not
being detained because the have committed any specific crimes.
Instead, they are being detained because the Administration believes
that if they were freed, they would attack the United States. Due to
the indefinite nature of such detention, however, the government must
conduct a painstaking balancing act, weighing security concerns
against individual rights.
B. CSRT Procedures
The CSRT is nearly identical in appearance and function to the
AR 190 tribunals used by the U.S. military to make the so-called
"Article V determination" regarding the Geneva Convention class to
which a detainee belongs. 135
Prior to any CSRT hearing or detention in Guantanamo,
however, a detainee must go through a six-stage vetting process. 13 6
First, "[alt the time of capture and based on available information,
and allowing them to rejoin the fight would only prolong the conflict and endanger coalition
forces and innocent civilians.').
131. See GC IV, supra note 9, art. V, 6 U.S.T. at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S. at 292.
132. See Lietzau, supra note 7, at 183-191 (discussing the inherent difficulty in determining
the end of this war against religious zealotry and ideology).
133. There have been literally hundreds of articles written about this. See, e.g., Michal R.
Belknap, Essay, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in Historical
Persepective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 447-80 (2002) (discussing past uses of military tribunals);
Amanda Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of
the Government's Right to Classify United States Citizens suspected of Terrorism as Enemy
Combatants and Try Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1465, 1467 (2003) (discussing distinctions in military proceedings and criminal trials); David
Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 427, 428 (2003)
(stating that "permitting military commissions to try terrorists is a radically different
approach').
134. Of the 550 detainees currently in Guantanamo, only 15 had been slated to go before the
Military Commission for trial as of July 7, 2004. Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111;
Dep't of Defense, Guantanamo Detainee Processes, http://www.dod.gov/news/Dec2004/
d20041217detpro.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
135. See infra Part ILE. (discussing the AR 190 tribunal).
136. Guatanamo Detainees, supra note 130, at 5.
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combatant and field commanders determine whether a captured
individual was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States
or coalition partners, and engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States. 137 Second, the immediate commander, after "a period
of initial detention," must decide whether to send the detainee to a
centralized holding area. 138 Third, "[a] military screening team at the
central holding area reviews all available information ... [w]ith
assistance from other U.S. government officials on the ground ... and
considering all relevant information . . . the military screening team
assesses whether the detainee should continue to be detained and
whether transfer to Guantanamo is warranted."'139 Fourth, a general
officer appointed by the combatant commander reviews the screening
team's assessment. 140  Fifth, an internal Department of Defense
("DOD") team in Washington reviews the detention before transfer.' 4 '
Finally, immediately upon arrival at Guantanamo, further reviews of
the detainee's status are made prior to the CSRT hearing. 42
According to the DOD, 10,000 individuals were screened and released
prior to their arrival in Guantanamo, 143 and over 200 were released
from Guantanamo prior to their trial before the CSRT or ARB.144
Once the detainees arrive in Guantanamo, they are required to
appear before a CSRT. 145 The CSRT Order dictates the composition of
the tribunal, and applies "only to foreign nationals held as enemy
combatants in the control of the Department of Defense at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba."'146 The CSRT consists of "three
neutral commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, each of whom
possesses the appropriate security clearance and none of whom was
involved in the apprehension, detention, interrogation, or previous
determination of status of the detainee."' 47  Each detainee is
appointed a "personal representative," a military officer with the






142. Id. at 6.
143. Id.
144. Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111, at 3.
145. See CSRT Order, supra note 127, at 1 ("Within 30 days after the detainee's personal
representative has been afforded the opportunity to review ... a Tribunal shall be convened to
review the detainee's status as an enemy combatant.").
146. CSRT Order, supra note 127, at 1.
147. Id. at 1-2.
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process. 148 This officer is typically not a lawyer. The officer is allowed
to view all evidence entered against the detainee, and is permitted to
share the unclassified portions of the evidence with the detainee. 149
The detainee then has advance notice of the unclassified factual basis
for his designation as an enemy combatant, is allowed to attend the
proceedings, 150 and is provided with an interpreter if necessary.151
The CSRT Order lays out the specific procedure to be followed
by the CSRT as well. Members of the Tribunal, including the
Recorder, shall be placed under oath. 152 The Record will include "all
the documentary evidence presented to the Tribunal," a summary of
witness testimony, "a written report of the Tribunal's decision, and a
recording of the proceeding"; it will exclude, however, all record of the
deliberations and the votes of the members. 53 The detainee will be
allowed to call witnesses if "reasonably available,"' 54 and to question
any witnesses presented against him.155  If witnesses are not
reasonably available, "written statements, preferably sworn, may be
submitted and considered as evidence."' 56 The detainee shall have the
right to testify, but may not be compelled to do so, and he may
introduce any relevant documentary evidence. 15 7
The Tribunal is not bound by ordinary rules of evidence. 58 The
Tribunal "shall be free to consider any information it deems relevant
and helpful .... [Flor example, it may consider hearsay evidence,
taking into account the reliability of such evidence in the
circumstances."1 59  Admissibility is based on how probative a
particular piece of evidence is.160 This policy recognizes the inherent
differences between combat and law-enforcement operations.' 6'
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id.
150. Except during deliberation and voting of the tribunal or where his presence would
"compromise national security." Id. at 2. His presence is not mandatory. See id.
151. Id.; see also Jess Bravin, War-Crimes Defense Lawyers Say They Lack Resources, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 2004, at B1 (listing various problems encountered at Guantanimo, including a
scarcity of qualified interpreters).
152. CSRT Order, supra note 127, at 2.
153. Id.
154. Members of the U.S. Armed Forces are not considered reasonably available if their
commanders determine their presence at the hearing would affect combat or support operations.
Id. at 2-3.
155. Id. at 2.




160. CSRT Order, supra note 127, at 3.
161. See Lietzau, supra note 7, at 215-17.
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Furthermore, a plurality of the Supreme Court has implicitly
approved the relaxed rules of evidence used by the CSRT in Hamdi,
allowing tailored proceedings. 162
The CSRT must use the preponderance of the evidence
standard of proof,163 which is the "traditional legal standard for status
determinations."'1 64 Additionally, the government enjoys a rebuttable
presumption of evidence in its favor. 165 Again, the Court discussed the
relaxation of this standard in Hamdi.166 These procedures appear to
have worked to some extent, as evidenced by the release of a handful
of detainees. 167
The facial similarity between the CSRT and the AR 190 has
created considerable confusion. The AR 190 tribunal and the CSRT
both employ the following procedures in an identical manner: the
oath, 168  the record, 169  open proceedings, 170  the right to an
interpreter,1 71 the presence of the detainee,1 72 the rules regarding
witnesses, 173 the right to testify,174 the prohibition on compulsion to
testify,' 75 and the burden of a preponderance of the evidence. 176 In
fact, much of the language in the CSRT Order and the AR is virtually
identical. 177 Furthermore, the AR 190 uses the same probative versus
reliability standard of evidentiary admissibility. 178
162. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004) ("[E]nemy combatant proceedings may
be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.").
163. CSRT Order, supra note 127, at 3.
164. Wedgewood, supra note 108.
165. CSRT Order, supra note 127, at 3.
166. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 ("[Tihe Constitution would not be offended by a presumption
in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one
and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.").
167. As of December 20, 2004, 230 CSRTs have released their determinations: 228 detainees
were determined to be enemy combatants and 2 were determined not to be enemy combatants
and subsequently released. Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111.
168. AR 190, supra note 60, 1-6e(1) ("Members of the Tribunal and the Recorder shall be
sworn .... ).
169. Id. 1-6e(2) ("A written record shall be made of the proceedings.").
170. Id. 1-6e(3) ("Proceedings shall be open except for .... ").
171. Id. 1-6e(5) ("[W]ill be provided an interpreter if necessary . .
172. Id. 1-6e(5) ("Persons whose status is to be determined shall be allowed to
attend ... ").
173. Id. 1-6e(6) ("[S]hall be allowed to call witnesses if reasonably available . .
174. Id. 1-6e(7) ("[H]ave a right to testify ... ").
175. Id. 1-6e(8) ("[M]ay not be compelled to testify ... .
176. Id. 1-6e(9) ("Preponderance of the evidence shall be the standard . .
177. Compare id. 1-6e(6) ("Persons whose status is to be determined shall be allowed to call
witnesses if reasonably available, and to question those witnesses called by the Tribunal.
Witnesses shall not be considered reasonably available if, as determined by their commanders,
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1629
There are, however, two significant differences between the
CSRT and the AR 190. First, unlike the CSRT, the AR 190 does not
expressly mandate a rebuttable presumption against the detainee.
Second, the only issue determined by the CSRT is enemy combatant
status, resulting in detention or release; the AR 190, however, allows
for classification in other categories. 179  Regardless of these
differences, the two tribunals are remarkably similar.
One can only speculate as to why the government chose to
write the statutes in such similar language. One obvious possibility is
that the Supreme Court plurality encouraged doing so in Hamdi,
expressly mentioning that the AR 190 may sufficiently balance the
interests of the United States and the detainee. 80 Another reason is
the ease of administration. The government may have been caught
off-guard by the decision in Hamdi and decided to minimize delay by
modeling the CSRT after the Commissions and the ARB, which were
proven forums by this point.
C. The ARB
The United States uses the ARB to "determine annually if
enemy combatants detained by the Department of Defense at...
Guatanamo... should be released, transferred, or continue to be
detained."'' The procedures used by the ARB are fairly straight-
forward. First, the detainee is notified of his upcoming ARB review
via a boiler-plate notification form. 8 2 The notification form tells
their presence at the hearing would affect combat or support operations. In these cases, written
statements, preferably sworn, may be submitted and considered as evidence."), with CSRT
Order, supra note 127, at 2-3 ("The detainee shall be allowed to call witnesses if reasonably
available, and to question those witnesses called by the Tribunal.... If such witnesses are from
within the U.S. Armed Forces, they shall not be considered reasonably available if, as
determined by their commanders, their presence at a hearing would affect combat or support
operations. In [these cases], written statements, preferably sworn, may be submitted and
considered as evidence.").
178. See supra Part II.C.
179. Id.
180. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2004) ('There remains the possibility that
the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for
such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the
status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention.").
181. ARB Implementation Memo, supra note 128, at 1. The order defines enemy combatants
as "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of
enemy armed forces." Id. at n.1.
182. For example, "A Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) has determined that you
are an enemy combatant. Because you are an enemy combatant, the United States may continue
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detainees, "[i]f you believe you do not pose a threat to the United
States or its allies, we recommend you immediately gather any
information that you believe will prove that you are no longer a threat
and why you should be released from detention."18 3  An "American
officer (called an Assisting Military Officer)" is appointed to help
detainees prepare their case, if they so desire.184 The ARB will not
hear any witness testimony, but will review the CSRT record, the
detainee's testimony if he chooses, and any "written statements from
family members or other persons who can explain why [the detainee]
[is] no longer a threat."18 5 The detainee's presence is at his option; if
he chooses not to attend, the ARB review will be held in his absence.18 6
Notably, the notification form also informs detainees of the procedures
they must follow to file for a writ of habeus corpus,18 7 a right recently
extended to Guantanamo detainees by the Supreme Court.18
The ARB is sui generis and not required by any body of law.18 9
Still, the existence of the ARB mitigates the harshness of indefinite
detention-that is, detention until the cessation of hostilities-which
is allowed under the CSRT. However, whether the ARB will have any
impact on detainees will take time to determine. The first ARB was
held on December 14, 2004; four have been held at the time of this
writing, and none of the results have yet been released.190 Lengthy
incarceration would seemingly Minimize an individual's opportunity to
rejoin an elusive terrorist network, thereby increasing his chances for
to detain you." Department of Defense, Notifications, http://www.dod.mil/news/Dec2004/





187. Id. ("You may ask a civilian judge to look at the lawfulness of your detention through a
process called a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. You may ask a friend or family member or a
lawyer to file such a petition with the court. If you do not have a lawyer or a family member or
friend who could file this petition for you, you may file your own petition. According to prior court
rulings, petitions may be sent to [the District Court]. If you do not wish to file a petition, you do
not have to do so. However, a court will only consider your case if you file a petition.").
188. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2691-92 (2004) (reversing the Court of Appeals'
determination that the litigation privilege does not reach aliens in military custody). Shafiq
Rasul was a British citizen captured in Afghanistan who actually was repatriated and
subsequently released before the Supreme Court heard his case. Id. at 2690 n.1.
189. Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111 ("Recognize and remember, the
Administrative Review Board's purely voluntary. That is, there's no Geneva requirement,
there's no precedent for this type of process. This is a process we instituted to assess whether an
enemy combatant continues to pose a threat to our country or to our allies or whether there's
other factors that might be reasons for continued detention.").
190. News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Department Conducts First
Administrative Review Board (Dec. 14, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
2004/nr20041214-1830.html; Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111.
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release. A detainee's opportunity to regain contact with his cell
lessens in time, due to the secretive nature of terrorist organizations.
However, the possibility of released detainees rejoining the fight is not
imaginary: of the 200 detainees released from Guantanamo, 12 "have
indeed returned to terrorism."191
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCEDURES
A. Soft Power and Negative World Opinion
The current procedures, even if well-thought out and
thoroughly litigated, exhibit serious defects. The most pressing issue
is public opinion around the world, particularly in Muslim countries,
the so-called "breeding grounds"192 of terrorists. The United States
should address the negative public opinion in these countries if for no
other reason than to promote its own self-interest. Joseph Nye, Dean
of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government argues that we cannot
"win the war on terror without attracting moderates and thereby
denying the extremists new recruits."' 93
Arguably, while United States' hard power is at an all-time
high, its soft power is reaching an historic low. 194 Soft power is defined
as the ability of a country to achieve its goals by attracting and
persuading others to adopt the same goals. 195 It differs from hard
power-the ability to use the "carrots and sticks" of economic and
military might to make others follow. 196 Both hard and soft power are
important in the war on terrorism. However, soft power is much less
expensive than coercion, and is therefore an asset that must be
nourished.197
The military should have a "greater sensitivity to the opinions
of others" when forming policies in this new war on terrorism. 98 No
191. Id.
192. A tired expression that seems to appear in the newspapers daily. See, e.g., Opinion,
Priorities for a New President, THE KITCHENER-WATERLOO RECORD, Nov. 3, 2004, at A12
("[V]icious and seemingly endless conflict.., continues to make the Middle East an area of
instability and a breeding ground for terrorists.").
193. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 14.
194. Id.
195. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Opinion, Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power, Int'l Herald Trib.,
Jan. 10, 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Nye, Propaganda].
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Editorial, A Dollop of Deeper American Values; Why
"Soft Power" Matters in Fighting Terrorism, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2004, at A19 [hereinafter Nye,
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matter how appropriate the CSRT procedures may be under various
legal regimes, if public opinion views the practice in a negative light,
the United States will lose its ability to influence people in other
countries. Additionally, the United States has often prided itself on
adopting the moral high ground. Even if the CSRT procedures are
justifiable under the law, few could argue that they comply with
commonly accepted notions of morality. The United States, in order to
increase its soft power, should use methods more easily justified by
morality. It is clear that the United States' treatment of detainees in
Guantanamo is unpopular, particularly in the Muslim world. 199
Regardless of how many hearings the Secretary of the Navy holds,
foreign citizens, particularly Muslims, 200  will protest the very
existence of the Guantanamo detention center.201  Though public
opinion should not be the Administration's top concern, the United
States must account for the erosion of its soft power if it truly wants to
prevail in the long-term. Furthermore, by not taking the moral high
ground in regards to the treatment of its captives, the Administration
may inadvertently be on the path to condoning the unfettered abuse of
any individual it feels threatens the security of the country.
B. Informational Security Concerns
The required secrecy of the CSRTs creates a dilemma for the
United States. The CSRT requires that all information be handled in
Soft Power] ("When someone in the audience asked Rumsfeld for his opinion on soft power, he
replied, 'I don't know what it means."').
199. See Nye, Soft Power, supra note 198 ("Long before the recent bombings in Madrid, polls
showed a dramatic decline in the popularity of the United States, even in countries such as
Britain, Italy and Spain, whose governments had supported us. And America's standing
plummeted in Islamic countries from Morocco to Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the world's
largest Islamic nation, three-quarters of the public said they had a favorable opinion of the
United States in 2000, but within three years that had shrunk to 15 percent.").
200. Olivia Ward, Religious Extremism is Back; Moral Ground is Shifting at Record Speed;
Followers are Motivated by Fear, Expert Says, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 2, 2005, at A13 ("The Sept. 11
attacks on the United States have fuelled apocalyptic visions even among mainstream believers.
The phrase 'clash of civilizations,' created by Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, has become
a real fear throughout the world. Huntington's theory, that the next great battle would not be
ideological but cultural - a sweeping term that includes religion and philosophy - haunts those
who see polarization of the West and Islam as inevitable.").
201. See, e.g., Elaine Cassel, They Say They Can Lock You Up for Life Without a Trial,
http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=4526 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) ("Military
officials, supported by legions of lawyers at the Department of 'Justice,' are thwarting at every
opportunity efforts of lawyers to represent prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, prisoners the
Court said are entitled to legal representation and judicial review of their detentions. Is the
Supreme Court going to force the Pentagon's hand and find Rumsfeld in contempt? I don't think
so!").
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accordance with Executive Order 12958.202 This order details how
sensitive information is handled by the government. 203  CSRT
procedures currently require members of the tribunal to possess TOP
SECRET clearance or higher.20 4 However, it is expensive for the
government to investigate individuals for security clearance. TOP
SECRET clearance requires, at a minimum, a background
investigation (BI);20 5 more likely, however, due to the sensitivity of the
information heard at the CSRTs, a participant would need to obtain a
TOP SECRET/SC120 6, requiring a more intensive "special" background
investigation (SBI).20 7 DOD expressly limits the number of positions,
or "billets," that have TOP SECRET access. 208 Generally, an average
military lawyer (Judge Advocate General or JAG) is not in a sensitive
billet requiring TOP SECRET clearance. While more billets can
always be created, the process takes time. Although some JAGs could
be given interim clearance, a lack of cleared military lawyers may
encourage the military to use officers in the CSRT tribunals who, due
to the nature of their military occupational specialty, already have
clearance. The "assisting officers" provided to detainees and 2 of the 3
panel members at ARBs and CSRTs, as they are not required to be
202. CSRT Order, supra note 127. Executive Order 12958 was amended on March 25, 2003,
and gives general procedures for the handling of classified information. See Exec. Order No.
12958, Classified National Security Information (Mar. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030325-1 1.html.
203. CSRT Order, supra note 127.
204. Id. TOP SECRET information is "information, the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that
the original classification authority is able to identify or describe." Exec. Order No. 12958, supra
note 202, § 1.2(1).
205. Dep't of Defense, Personnel Security Program § C2.3.5, http://www.dtic.millwhs/
directives/corres/pdf/52002r_0187/p52002r.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Personal
Security Program] ("The BI is the principal type of investigation conducted when an individual
requires TOP SECRET clearance or is to be assigned to a critical sensitive position. The BI
normally covers a 5-year period and consists of a subject interview, NAC, LACs, credit checks,
developed character references (3), employment records checks, employment references (3), and
select scoping as required to resolve unfavorable or questionable information.").
206. "SCI" stands for "Special Compartmented Intelligence." See Marine Corps Law
Enforcement Manual, MCO P5580.2, at I-14(Oct. 23, 1998) available at http://www.usmc.
mil/directiv.nsf/6c683984fdle09cc85256c75006e6395/59fe216b966f89a6852568500064342d/$FIL
EJMCO%20P5580.2A.pdf.
207. Id. § DL1.1.26 (An SBI is "[a] personnel security investigation consisting of all of the
components of a BI plus certain additional investigative requirements .... The period of
investigation for an SBI is the last 15 years or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter,
provided that the last 2 full years are covered and that no investigation will be conducted prior to
an individual's 16th birthday.").
208. Id. § C3.1.5.1. ("To standardize and control the issuance of Top Secret clearances within
the Department of Defense, a specific designated billet must be established and maintained for
all DoD military and civilian positions requiring access to Top Secret information. Only persons
occupying these billet positions will be authorized a Top Secret clearance.").
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lawyers, probably are not lawyers. 20 9 Arguably, having a nonlawyer
represent the detainees increases the probability of an incorrect status
determination.
C. Lack of Arabic Interpreters
Military lawyers in Guantanamo have publicly commented on
the lack of trained Arabic interpreters available to them.210 A scarcity
of security-cleared military interpreters is a significant problem
around the world.211 In fact, Arabic-speaking, natural-born U.S.
citizens are relatively rare. 212 Naturalized U.S. citizens, of course are
used as interpreters, but they are a finite resource. Although the
military often contracts with foreign nationals to provide services, 213 a
non-citizen can never have interim access to TOP SECRET
information. 214 There is a very real security threat from foreign-born
translators in Guantanamo. 2 5 These interpreters would have to be
209. See CSRT Order, supra note 127.
210. See Bravin, supra note 151 ("[T]he lawyers [of one detainee], Army Maj. Mark Bridges
and Navy Lt. Cmdr. Philip Sundel, say they lost their first Arabic interpreter months ago and
haven't received a replacement. 'Without being able to communicate with our client, how can we
possibly represent his issues?' says Maj. Bridges.").
211. See Gail Gibson & Scott Shane, Contractors Act as Interrogators Control: The Pentagon's
Hiring of Civilians to Question Prisoners Raises Accountability Issues, BALTIMORE SUN, May 4,
2004, at 1A ("At an October Senate hearing, a Pentagon official said that staffing shortages,
particularly of Arabic linguists, had forced the Department of Defense to hire contractors not
only as interpreters but for interrogation work as well. 'We do use contractors as a means to hire
linguists and interrogators,' said Charles Abell, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for
personnel and readiness.").
212. See Edward M. Eveld, Interest in Arabic Growing Among College Students: Reasons for
Interest Upset Some Instructors, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 3, 2004, at A28 (describing
shortage of Arabic speakers in United States).
213. See ABC News, Lack of Arabic Translators Hurting U.S., http://www.campus-
watch.org/article/id/882 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Lack of Arabic Translators] ("A
recent Army report on intelligence-gathering in Iraq found the military relying on translators
who had been 'convenience store workers and cab drivers' in the United States."). The CIA is also
reportedly actively recruiting Arab-Americans. Id.
214. "[Clompelling reasons may exist to grant access to classified information to an
immigrant alien or a foreign national. Such individuals may be granted a 'Limited Access
Authorization' (LAA) in those rare circumstances where a non-U.S. citizen possesses a unique or
unusual skill or expertise that is urgently needed in pursuit of a specific DoD requirement
involving access to specified classified information for which a cleared or clearable U.S. citizen is
not available." Personnel Security Program, supra note 205, § C3.4.3. 1. However, "LAAs may be
granted only at the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL level. LAAs for TOP SECRET are
prohibited." Id. § C3.4.3.3.1.
215. See Lack of Arabic Translators, supra note 213 ("At Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where
hundreds of suspected terrorists are held, the arrests of three translators on spying charges
prompted the military to re-evaluate some interrogations. 'If somebody from Syria comes in and
says, "I want to join the FBI," you've got to think twice about that,' said James Carafano, who
studies defense issues at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.").
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thoroughly investigated which, again, is time-consuming and
expensive. Training new interpreters to speak Arabic competently is
even harder.216
D. The Confusing Similarity Between CSRTs and AR 190s
As mentioned in Section III.B., the CSRT is facially similar to
the AR 190, most likely because it was quick and easy to implement,
and because of the Supreme Court's reference to the AR 190 in
Hamdi.217 The similarity between the two tribunals is problematic,
however, because critics conflate the determinations of the two
tribunals and then protest the Administration's departure from the
historically employed procedures. The Administration has been slow
to respond to these critics and should develop a coherent public
relations response. Again, the law of armed conflict, developed only
after world-changing wars, does not appear broad enough to
encompass the current war on terror's blend of combat and law
enforcement.
An additional problem caused by the similarities stems from
the fact that in Hamdi the Court arguably only hinted that an AR
190-like tribunal would be appropriate for factual circumstances
specific to Hamdi's case. In this case, plaintiff Hamdi was caught in a
zone of active combat, the fields of Afghanistan, and allegedly fought
actively against U.S. forces. 218 Ironically, no one likely would have
protested had Mr. Hamdi been shot or bombed during active combat;
yet his legal detention spurred emotional rhetoric and extensive
debate. In any case, Hamdi was captured on the battlefield. The AR
190 was designed to be a battlefield tribunal, and, if needed, would
have been employed relatively soon after Hamdi's capture.
The AR 190 regulation gives detailed instructions regarding
how to deal with individuals captured during active combat. After the
initial search and detention, the captured individual will be sent to
the appropriate prison camp (or "internment facility" as per the AR
216. Id. ("Arabic and other languages of the Middle East are very different from English. It
can take non-native speakers several years to learn and speak it comfortably. 'It's easier to train
someone to fly an F-14 than it is to speak Arabic,' said Kevin Hendzel, a spokesman for the
American Translators Association.").
217. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2004) ("There remains the possibility that
the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for
such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the
status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention.").
218. See id. at 2642 (discussing that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan in combat, carrying
a weapon against U.S. and allied forces).
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190): civilians detained for security reasons will go to one place, and
POWs to another. This procedure happens relatively quickly as
sending the detainees to several centralized locations limits the
manpower needed to guard them. The AR 190 procedure occurs after
capture but before internment, assuming a doubt arises as to which
camp the detainees should be sent.
The CSRT procedures, on the other hand, should be completely
different. First, there is less urgency in Guantanamo. Further, the
CSRT procedures must be broad enough to encompass individuals
captured in places where a Geneva-recognized conflict does not exist,
like the Horn of Africa. The CSRT should also look different, not only
for public relations reasons, but because an erroneous CSRT
determination would do more damage than a faulty AR 190
determination. In an AR 190, the detainee will likely be sent to one of
many prison camps. An erroneous determination would simply mean
someone is in the wrong camp. By contrast, the cost of error in a
CSRT is potentially huge. If the situation requires it, as in Iraq for
example, the Army could still establish AR 190 tribunals to make the
POW determination. Going through both an AR 190 and the
structurally similar CSRT is quite inefficient, but, unfortunately, that
is what the current practice appears to require
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Balancing Test
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court struck a balance between the
interest of the detainee and the interest of the United States by using
the balancing test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge.219 The Court
explained, "Mathews dictates that the due process required in any
given instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that
will be affected by the official action' against the Government's
asserted interest, 'including the function involved' and the burdens the
government would face in providing greater process."220 Applied to the
case at hand, the interest of the detainee is clear: it "is the most
elemental of liberty interests-the interest in being free from physical
detention by one's own government."221 Although the language in
219. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).




Hamdi, repeatedly refers to the rights of a U.S. citizen, 222 the personal
liberty interest of a non-citizen detainee is identical. An additional
factor that must be placed on the detainee's side of the scale is public
opinion. Again, the United States should only consider public opinion
to the extent that a positive shift in world opinion would help it obtain
its objectives. 223
The Matthews test also dictates that one must next consider
the risk of an erroneous decision. 224 In the case of trying a detainee,
the chance of erroneous deprivation of freedom is relatively high. The
detainee's considerable burden of proof and the relaxed admissibility
standard could possibly allow an innocent prisoner to be indefinitely
detained. Furthermore, prolonged detention of even a friendly
individual probably guarantees lifelong animosity to the United
States, especially if coercive interrogation techniques are employed.
Additionally, unconventional factors weighing on the
defendant's side should be considered. The United States must
anticipate how U.S. service members will be treated if they are
captured incident to hostile action. It is important to keep in mind
that, "Obedience to Geneva rules rests on another bedrock moral
principle: reciprocity. Nations will treat an enemy's soldiers humanely
because they want and expect their adversaries to do the same."225
While the United States is arguably doing its best to comply with
international law in the war against terrorism, it is foreseeable that in
the future a hostile country could use our enemy combatant
procedures against U.S. soldiers who rigidly comply with the Geneva
Convention and deserve the protection afforded by POW status.
On the other side of the Matthews equation, one must consider
"the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that
those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not
return to battle against the United States."226 Of the approximately
200 detainees released from Guantanamo, the United States has
confirmed that at least twelve have returned to participate in actions
hostile to the United States.227 The fact that al Qaeda used four to
five man teams to hijack each airplane on September 11 demonstrates
222. See, e.g., id. at 2647 ("We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of a citizen's right to
be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law.").
223. See supra Part V.A.
224. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 ("An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness
and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards.")
225. MacDonald, supra note 116.
226. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2647.
227. Secretary England Briefing, supra note 111, at 2.
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that a single terrorist could theoretically play a key role in a
devastating attack on the United States.228 If a released detainee
later successfully attacked the United States, the American people
would likely not agree that liberty interests of that detainee should
have outweighed their interest in national security. For example, the
FBI and CIA were harshly criticized for the way they handled the
investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui. 229 A detailed investigation into
Moussaoui's activities might have uncovered the entire 9/11 plot.230
Similarly, detainees are important sources of information that
could be used to prevent future attacks. If a detainee turns out to be a
major source of intelligence, he may be entitled to less process. This is
an easy economic calculus, albeit an unfeeling one. Regardless, the
possibility of obtaining information from a detainee that would
prevent a catastrophic attack must be taken into account in the
balancing test, although potential life imprisonment cannot be
justified exclusively by informational value. 231  At some point,
however, especially in the complex and covert world of underground
terrorism cells, the information that the detainee might be able to
provide will become stale, and its weight in the balance will
decrease. 232
An additional factor to weigh when considering the due process
rights of a detainee is the possibility that providing increased process
will create an incentive to kill rather than capture the enemy. For
example, if an innocent civilian is accidentally killed in the confusion
of battle, a determination of his status is irrelevant as "what happens
in the fog of battle comes to light on only rare occasions-few take
interest in the rights of those who are already dead.' '233 A modern day
228. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-4.
229. Moussaoui, the so-called "Twentieth Highjacker," was in FBI custody before the
September 11th attacks and, had he been questioned thoroughly, perhaps could have uncovered
the whole plot. See Dan Eggen, "FBI Assailed for 9/11 'Failure,"' St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 10,
2005, at 1A.
230. See id. at 273-74 ("The agents in Minnesota were concerned that the U.S. Attorney's
Office in Minneapolis would find insufficient probable cause of a crime to obtain a criminal
warrant to search Moussaoui's laptop computer. Agents at FBI headquarters believed there was
insufficient probable cause. Minneapolis therefore sought a special warrant under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the search .... To do so, however, the FBI needed to
demonstrate probable cause that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power, a demonstration
that was not required to obtain a criminal warrant but was a statutory requirement for a FISA
warrant. The case agent did not have sufficient information to connect Moussaoui to a "foreign
power," so he reached out for help, in the United States and overseas.").
231. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646-48 (weighing Hamdi's liberty interests against the
Government's interests).
232. The ARB is an excellent mechanism to annually review the informational value of
detainees. The ARB must therefore be retained and used in good faith.
233. Lietzau, supra note 7, at 128.
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example of the preference for killing over capture exists in Colombia.
For political reasons, the Uribe government treats captured insurgent
Marxist guerillas as criminals rather than combatants, thereby
mandating a requirement that captured "guerrillas be taken to a
prosecutor for presentation before a magistrate almost immediately
subsequent to capture," no matter how remote the fighting locale.234
"Consequently..., there are extremely few captures of [Marxist]
combatants." 235 Similarly, the current debate in the war on terrorism
does not address the killing of combatants in Afghanistan or Iraq, but
rather the detention of individuals. Again, the default treatment of
one's enemy in combat is destruction.
Overly-restrictive procedures may also give the United States
an incentive to allow allied countries with considerably less concern
for individual rights to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists.
International law disallows the transfer of suspects to countries if the
transferring country has reason to believe the receiving country might
use torture. The United States, however, uses the technique of
"rendition," returning a detainee to his native country. 236  It is
relatively easy for the United States to transfer the detainee either to
his native government or the government which captured him (the
newly-formed governments of Iraq or Afghanistan, for example).
Unfortunately for the captive, these governments may be more
tolerant of human exploitation.237 In fact, at the time of this writing,
one detainee was currently suing in federal court to block his return to
his native Egypt because he fears that he will be tortured upon
return.238 If the CSRT procedures become too restrictive, it is easy to
imagine a results-driven (if not Machiavellian) bureaucrat taking
advantage of rendition.
B. The Need for International Discourse
The United States must begin an international public discourse
about the need for change under international law. Historically, the
law of war has only changed after world-changing conflict. Now is the
time for the United States to take the lead and begin a discourse on
new treaty negotiations to supplement the law of war. An objective
234. Id. at 128 n.301.
235. Id.
236. Neil A. Lewis, Detainee Seeking to Bar His Transfer Back to Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2005, at A24.
237. See David Beatson, Afghanistan: What Are We Fighting For?, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug.
10, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 12486568 (detailing human rights abuses by state forces).
238. Id.
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discussion involving Muslim nations could help repair the United
States' tarnished image, thus increasing its reserve of soft power.
Additionally, it is possible that other countries will actually
participate in these discussions and help create a law of war that
applies to the unique mix of law enforcement and combat that
counter-terrorism entails. Michael Chertoff, former head of the
Justice Department's Criminal Division, agrees, stating that it is time
we take a more "systematic" and "universal" approach to the problem
of enemy combatants. 239
C. Congress Must Take Action
Congress must break its silence and begin deliberation on what
procedures should be used to identify, detain, and interrogate enemy
combatants. The U.S. Constitution provides, "Congress shall have
Power... To define and punish. .. Offenses against the Law of
Nations; [and] ... To declare War... and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land .... 240  Despite this seemingly nonoptional
constitutional mandate, Congress has remained silent on how to
proceed with captured enemies. In fact, it has not fulfilled its
constitutional duties in this respect since the 1940s. Congress "has
displayed no stomach for grappling with constitutional questions that
have no obviously popular answers. '241
Even Bush officials privately express their frustration with
Congress's avoidance of the enemy combatant debate. 242 Of course,
the Administration, probably purposefully, has never asked Congress
to act. Regardless, in these "uncharted waters in [the] war against
terror," Congress must have the fortitude to begin the legislative
process about how we should identify and detain enemy
combatants. 243 An open, public legislative debate would legitimize the
process, as well as allow for a suitable compromise which takes into
account the aforementioned Mathews factors. Since much of the
leeway given to the President by the Supreme Court relies upon the
Authorization for the Use of Force, Congress clearly has the power to
239. See Susan Schmidt, Bipartisan Debate on Patriot Act Is Urged: Legal Tools to Fight
Terrorism at Issue, WASH. POST, Nov 14, 2003, at All.
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
241. Opinion, Fill the Legal Void: Resposnses to Terrorism Raise Important Legal Questions,
and it's Up to Congress to Determine How to Answer Them, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 11, 2005, at
B8.
242. See Siobhan Gorman, What's Next for Enemy Combatants?, 36 NAT'L J. 2107, 2107
(2004) ("[S]ome members of Congress, as well as some former Bush administration officials, say
that it's up to Congress .... ).
243. Id. (quoting former Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh).
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modify the terms of its delegation. Congressional silence in this case
is forcing the judiciary into the dangerous and untenable position of
having to decide "matters relating to exercise of war-making
powers ... the most fundamental of 'political questions.' 244
D. CSRTs Should Not Resemble AR 190s
In order to avoid confusion, the CSRT procedures themselves
should be changed so as to eliminate their quasi-AR 190 appearance.
A change in appearance, even if arguably cosmetic, would stress the
difference between the two courts to the international community.
The tribunal should consist exclusively of legally-trained judges,
either military or civilian. The forum should not resemble a criminal
court or a court martial; it should be sui generis, much like the ARB,
reflecting the unique nature of the war on terror. The government
must acknowledge that, because of the potentially indefinite detention
of the suspected terrorists, this tribunal should not be analogized to a
magistrate's probable cause hearing; nor, however, should it be
analogized to a complete trial. As this tribunal will take place far
from the battlefield and time is no longer of the essence, the tribunal's
work should not be analogized to an AR 190. The new tribunal must
carefully mix law enforcement and law of war norms in both
appearance and operation. One academic, Professor Harvey Rishikof,
has tried to spark debate on the possibility of creating a Federal
Terrorist Court, tailor-made to the unique problems of the war on
terror.245  While his proposal has some shortcomings,246 it is a
thoughtful contribution and an example of the beginnings of
intelligent rather than emotional discourse.
E. Recommended Changes to Specific CSRT Procedures
While the overall structure of the CSRTs should remain,
changes need to be made to some of the specific procedures. For
244. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. C1. 751, 773 (2003) (dismissing a
Sudanese pharmaceutical plant owner's claim of a 'taking' by the United States for its 1998
cruise missile strikes). As of the final edit of this note, the Senate has begun hearings on
detainee procedures including CSRTs. See Military Justice and Detention Policy in the Global
War on Terrorism: Hearing of the Personnel Subcomm. of the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005).
245. Rishikof, supra note 1, at 29-38.
246. See Lietzau, supra note 7, at 210 ("One also could say that the Rishikof proposal leads
us to the edge of a slippery slope in both bodies of law. On the civilian side, it permits a
derogation of well-established due process standards based only on the nature of the offense. On
the law of war side, it crosses a line that would make a return very difficult.").
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practical reasons, the probative standard of admissibility should be
retained, including hearsay.247 Much of the information will be
derived from human intelligence, or "HUMINT,"248 which, by
definition, is often hearsay. Additionally, soldiers or government
agents still actively involved in combat operations should not be
expected to attend the CSRT in Cuba. Such a requirement would be
unnecessarily expensive and would ultimately add little value. The
probative admission standard, which weighs probative value and
reliability of evidence-and which is approved by both the Supreme
Court and, in other settings, the international community-must be
retained. 249
The burden of proof on the detainee in the CSRT, however,
should be changed. In order to truly blend law of war and law
enforcement norms, the burden, too, should be some combination of
both. The "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard clearly does not
meet the Mathews test, yet placing on the detainee the burden of
proving the matter by the "preponderance of the evidence" does not
seem appropriate either. I suggest only a modest change: retain the
standard of the preponderance of the evidence, but shift the burden to
the United States. The government should have to show concrete
facts with specificity that the particular detainee before the CSRT
deserves (possible) lifetime detention. The ARB must be retained, as
the scales of the Mathews test often shift over time. The ARB will
periodically review cases to prevent wrongful lifetime imprisonment.
Detainees should also be provided with a trained Judge
Advocate General to represent them throughout the process.
Furthermore, the tribunal should consist of three law-trained military
judges, as opposed to the minimum of one currently prescribed.
Although there may be a lack of cleared lawyers and interpreters,
providing legally-trained personnel and a more deliberate process
would help improve the global image of the United States, thus
increasing its soft power.
The United States should also consider permitting limited
appeals to a court with the required security clearance (perhaps the
247. See supra Part III.B.
248. "HUMINT is the intelligence derived from information collected from people and related
documents, using passively and actively acquired human sources to gather information to
answer intelligence requirements and to cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. HUMINT tasks
include but are not limited to: Source operations using tactical and other developed sources;
Liaison with host nation officials and allied counterparts; Debriefing of civilian populace;
Interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and detainees; and Exploitation of adversary and open-
source documents, media, and material." GlobalSecurity.org, Military Intelligence: Always Out
Front, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/mi.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
249. See supra Part III.B.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") Court),250 to allow for a
limited review of the facts justifying detention. A special. court with
streamlined procedures could improve the legitimacy of the CSRT and
provide a better appellate process than the habeus corpus procedure
that is rife with forum-shopping problems. 251
The CSRTs should become open to the maximum extent
allowed by security. While the substance of any given tribunal must
remain secret for obvious reasons, better disclosure of the exact
procedures should be provided. The current method of publishing
orders on the web with no explanation is insufficient. The executive
does not necessarily owe anyone an explanation for measures taken in
wartime, but a more transparent process may improve public opinion.
The danger in changing the CSRT procedures is, of course, the
possibility of public confusion as to which regime rules: the law of war
or traditional criminal law enforcement. The correct answer,
simultaneously, is both and neither. The procedures must be carefully
designed to be something unique. Above all, the Administration must
better articulate the reasons behind the current procedures if they
remain unaltered, or explain any future changes in the procedures.
While it may be difficult to clarify the procedures, the public
perception of Guantanamo as a "legal black hole"252 must be corrected.
The Administration must explain, in laymen's terms, that the war on
terror is something new and different. This is not a "desperate times
call for desperate measures" argument, but rather a statement that
the current situation is not covered by international law. The world
has changed since the Geneva Conventions conceived of the types of
conflict it needed to cover, and traditional criminal law mechanisms
are no longer sufficient to prosecute global terrorists. A reference to
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission concerning improved
250. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2005) ("The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly
designate 11 district court judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits of whom no
fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia who shall constitute a court
which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic
surveillance anywhere within the United States under the procedures set forth in this chapter.").
251. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2711 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder today's
strange holding Guantanamo Bay detainees can petition in any of the 94 federal judicial
districts. The fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the district of detention that the
statute requires has been converted from a factor that precludes their ability to bring a petition
at all into a factor that frees them to petition wherever they wish-and, as a result, to forum
shop. For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration of our
military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism of the worst
sort. I dissent.").
252. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Editorial, Tribunals are Defying a U.S. Supreme Court Decision
that These Prisoners Must Get Due Process -Basic Fairness, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Dec 5, 2004, at
38 (quoting Jameel Jaffer, an ACLU attorney).
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cooperation between the CIA and FBI seems particularly apt: military
regimes and traditional law enforcement regimes must cooperate
because the counter-terrorism effort requires forays into both fields.
The goal of the new CSRT procedures should be broad enough
to encompass cases at both extremes of the spectrum between law
enforcement and armed conflict: a mujahidin,253 actively engaged in
combat against U.S. forces in foreign lands with AK-47 in hand, and a
non-citizen "sleeper"254 who aided and abetted terrorism within the
United States and was arrested by law enforcement personnel.
Improved procedures and justifications could forge a Tribunal that
was not only broad enough to cover both types of detainees, but
specific enough to silence critics who erroneously rely on traditional
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In response to the attacks on September 11, the Bush
Administration fundamentally changed its method of conducting
counterterrorism. The war on terror is a new and unique embodiment
of both law of war and law enforcement norms. While the Geneva
Convention does apply to this armed conflict, it does not cover
sufficiently the battle against non-nation groups like al Qaeda.
Improving the CSRTs would be a workable compromise and would
adequately balance the competing concerns of national security and
the rights of detainees, especially considering the review provided by
ARBs. Clearly, however, they should be improved.
253. "Mujahidin," Arabic for "holy warrior," was first introduced into the American parlance
to describe Islamic Afghan guerrillas fighting against invading Soviet forces. Marine Corps
Institute, Afghanistan: An Introduction to the Country and People, available at http://www.mci.
usmc.mil/downloads/pdf/afghanistan- 2004.pdf.
254. See Sonni Effron, U.S. Options Few in Feud With Iran; Alarmed at Tehran's Nuclear
Ambitions, Washington for Now Can Only Watch and Wait, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at Al
("Several American officials have said they believe Hezbollah has 'sleeper' cells raising money in
at least five major U.S. urban areas.").
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Finally, the United States must better articulate its legal
reasoning behind the new procedures and reverse the erosion of its
soft power. Congress must fulfill its obligations and begin to legislate
as to how the military should determine a detainee's status. The
CSRTs should be changed to avoid facial similarity to the AR 190.
The admissibility of hearsay and preponderance standard should be
retained, but the government should bear the burden. To the extent
that it can do so, and still retain classified information, the
Administration should also make the proceedings as transparent as
possible.
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